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SIX PROBLEM AREAS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE*
WARREN FREEDMAN* *

THE

Alabama has become the most recent addition to
the ever growing list of states which have enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code.' While eight states2 have failed to adopt the
Code, prospects are good for the eventual enactment of the Code
in these jurisdictions.8 It therefore behooves us to make this timely
study of the importance of the Uniform Commercial Code upon
4
product liability law today.
STATE OF

Basic to our review is a recognition that the warranty aspects
of products liability are governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. Section 2-102 declares that Article 2 [which incidentally is
the longest article, consisting of seven parts and 104 sections, or
about one-fourth of the entire Code] applies to all transactions in
goods, except security transactions and statutory sales to special
classes of buyers. Section 2-715(2)(b), relating to the damages of
the buyer, states that consequential damages of a seller's breach
of warranty include "injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty." Section 2-719(3) pertains
to a limitation on consequential damages "for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods." Generally, state laws which were
applicable to the warranty aspects of products liability have been
rescinded by enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. In New
* This article was presented as a speech before the Southeastern Corporate Law
Institute on May 1, 1965, at Grand Hotel, Point Clear, Ala., and also appears in the
Defense Law Journal, Volume 14, Number 5, for October 1965.
0* Mr. Freedman, currently counsel for the Bristol-Myers Company, was admitted
to the New York Bar in 1949 and has since authored numerous books and articles in
the field of products liability. In addition, he is presently a member of the Products
Liability Committee of the American Bar Association.
1 Effective date, January 1, 1967.
2 Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Vermont.
8 The American Bar Association Committee on State Legislation had rated Delaware,
South Carolina and South Dakota as having an "excellent" chance of adopting the Code
in 1965. However, in Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, and South Dakota, bills seeking adoption of the Code were not even introduced in the 1965 session of the Legislature.
4 The U.C.C. was six years in preparation before endorsed in Fall 1951, by the
American Bar Association. It was first adopted by Pennsylvania in 1953, effective July 1,
1954. After New York recommended changes, a revised version was introduced into the
Massachusetts Legislature in 1957 and made effective October 1, 1958. Subsequent
changes are now incorporated in the 1962 Official Text.
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York, for example, Article 5 of the New York Personal Property
Law (the New York version of the Uniform Sales Act) has been
repealed.
I submit that the important problem areas are delineated
under the following six axioms:
(1) necessity of "sale" of product before warranties can
arise;
(2) breach of warranty presupposes "fault" on the part of
the seller and/or manufacturer;
(3) the 4-year statute of limitations does control;
(4) disclaimers of liability and limitation on consequential
damages are enforcible;
(5) extension of benefits of warranties to designated persons is fait accompli; and
(6) the definitions of warranty, express and implied, must
be reasonable.
I.

NECESSITY OF "SALE"

OF PRODUCT

Under § 2-106(1), the transaction in goods is defined in
terms limiting the transaction to the sale of goods, i.e., a sale "consists of the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."
Section 2-204 emphasizes the contractual basis of the sale. Recently, the federal court in Pennsylvania, 5 and the state courts of
Connecticut, 6 Tennessee, 7 Illinois,8 and Delaware9 have all ruled
that, in the absence of a sale of a product, no express or implied
warranty can arise. Federal Judge Kirkpatrick, in 1964, in the
Young case (Pennsylvania), 10 ruled, as a matter of law, that no
warranty will be implied in favor of one who is not in the cate5 Young v. Goldenberg, No. 32723, U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa., Jan. 7, 1964. See
also Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,
409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
6 Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963); Garthwaite v.
Burgio, Conn. Super. Ct., May 8, 1964; Hart v. Meadowbrook Hair Fashions, Inc., No.
635-10466, Conn. Super. Ct., Feb. 13, 1964; Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor and Sons, No.
642-2289, Conn. Cir. Ct. at Bristol, Sept. 5, 1964.
7 O'Rear v. Bendix Aviation Corp. (Tenn. 1964) (not yet reported).
8 Van Dyke v. Martin Beauty Salon, Ill. Cir. Ct., Super. Div., Cook County, Jan. 22,
1965.
9 Baum v. Blecker Beauty Shops, Inc., Del. Super. Ct., 1964 (as yet unreported).
10 Young v. Goldenberg, supra note 5.
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gory of a purchaser in the distributive chain. In New York in 1961,
in Deeves v. FabricsFire Hose Co.," the court declared:
A cause of action for breach of warranty ordinarily depends upon
a contractual relation between the parties to the action. A personal injury suffered by one not a party to the contract .... may
not be recompensed by suit against the seller.

In Connecticut in 1963, in the Epstein case,' 2 the court noted
that the plaintiff asked for a beauty treatment, and not for the
purchase of goods; hence, neither party intended "a transaction
in goods" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Indeed, the court reasoned that the materials used in the performance of those services were patently incidental to the subject,
which was treatment, and not the purchase of an article. And the
Delaware Superior Court, in Ptomey v. Sayers," also determined
that a warranty cannot arise in the absence of a sale. Judge Lynch,
in his opinion, citing the decision in the Epstein case, stated:
It clearly appears that plaintiff did not purchase from and defendant did not sell to plaintiff any article or commodity; plaintiff
entered defendant's place of business and one of defendant's operators rendered services to plaintiff in giving a permanent hair
Whether the giving of a beauty treatment-which, in
wave ....
my opinion, would involve a treatment of a person's hair, including the giving of a permanent wave-amounts to a sale of goods
or rendering of a service, is considered and determined in Epstein
v. Giannattasio. It was held in that case that this is a transaction
of "service" and no claim can be asserted on any theory of breach
It is clear from such discussion that the same
of warranty ....
legal theories applicable in such instances are likewise applicable
to treatments in beauty shops, including treatments of the human
hair.14

And, to a similar effect is the reasoning of Judge Jacobs of the
Connecticut Circuit Court in 1964, in the Cassina15 case:
The normal methods of sale and distribution of the cosmetic
product (like other mass-marketed consumer products) seldom
involve a direct sale by the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.
A substantial volume of cosmetic sales is distributed into professional channels such as beauty salons and barber shops, which
service businesses obviously do not "sell" the product to the pa-

ll 29 Misc. 2d 136, 136-7, 210 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (1961).
12 Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
13 Del. Super. Ct., New Castle County, Sept. 22, 1964.
14 Ibid.
15 Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor and Sons, No. 642-2289, Conn. Cir. Ct. at Bristol,
Sept. 5, 1964.
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tron, but merely render a "service" which may consist of application of the given cosmetic product along with other products and
other services to the patron. Freedman, Allergy and Products Liability 169 (1961 ed.) .

.

.

When account is taken of the character

of the work to be done in the present case ("stripping" and "dyeing" hair), the amount of the compensation to be paid for the
bargain ($25.00); the peculiar subject-matter of the contract, the
comparative values of the material used and the services rendered
-these are potent factors which must be weighed-the court is
led to the inevitable result that the parties bargained essentially
for work, labor and services, not one for the sale of goods. (italics
added)

Even in Georgia under a unique statute providing for
damages against a product manufacturer for breach
warranty, the courts have held that the plaintiff must
chaser" or an "ultimate consumer" before he could
the statutory warranty. 16

recovery of
of implied
be a "purrecover on

The Tennessee Court of Appeal in Kyker v. General Motors
Corp.17 dismissed the case against the product manufacturer, not
only because of lack of privity of contract, but because there was
no evidence that the product manufacturer was "a contracting
party to this sale." The Nevada Supreme Court, in Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co.,'" has held that the injured plaintiff was not a
"buyer" within the meaning of the then Uniform Sales Act, and
therefore could not recover for breach of warranty. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, as recently as November 25, 1964, in
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co.19 opined: "Warranty-actual
or implied-is contractual. It does not extend beyond the parties
to the contract." Citing Prince v. Smith2 and other recent North
Carolina decisions,2 ' the court concluded that warranty extends
no further than the parties to the contract of sale.
16 Griffith v. Chevrolet Motor Division, 105 Ga. App. 588, 125 S.E.2d 525 (1962).

17 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964).
18 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963).
19 265 N.C. 1, -, 138 S.E.2d 753, 754 (1964).
20 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
21 Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963), and Wyatt
v. North Carolina Equipment Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960). Also a disclaimer
of warranties and a limitation on the buyer's remedies were upheld by the North Carolina
Supreme Court on September 23, 1964, in Lilley v. Manning Motor Co., 262 N.C. 468,
-, 137 S.E.2d 847, 849-50 (1964), where the Court opined: (1) "there can be no implied
warranty of quality . . . where there is an express warranty (disclaimer)"; (2) "under
the terms of the (express) warranty defendant (vendor) was entitled to notice of defects
in the parts of the automobile and to be given an opportunity to remedy the 'deficiencies."
The action against the product manufacturer was dismissed on demurrer.
See also Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., 153 So. 2d 55 (1963), where the Florida

SIX PROBLEM AREAS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Liability has generally been denied when a "sale" was not
consummated nor completed, as where the buyer made a selection
but had not yet paid for the product. In the leading case, Day v.
Grand Union Co.,2 2 the plaintiff picked up a bottle of beer from
the counter of a self-service supermarket and the bottle allegedly
"exploded" in her hand. No recovery was permitted upon the
alleged breach of warranty.
The "service" of food or drink to be consumed upon the
premises has, however, been expressly by statute constituted as a
"sale" giving rise to warranties, even though the element of "service" predominates in the transaction, and transfer of title to the
product is incidental to the "service" and not the subject of a
sale. 23 In Alabama, in Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co.2 4 the
court overruled defendant's demurrer that there was no warranty
in a contract for professional services to design a drainage system.
The Alabama test apparently employed in this distinctly minority
view finding implied warranty in a "service," was that all of the
elements of the service were within the exclusive control of the
professional engineer. However, construction contracts, where the
furnishing of materials is only incidental to the work and labor
performed, do not come within the purview of the Uniform Commercial Code; 25 and where service predominates, as in requested
automobile repairs, "there can ,be no warranty in the usual sense,
without a sale. ' 26 In a leading case, Gagne v. Bertran,27 the California Supreme Court reversed the plaintiff's jury verdict as to
the allegation of breach of implied warranty, upon the grounds
that the test-hole digging contract was one for the performance
of a service.
Appellate Court expressly rejected the doctrine of implied warranty as extending to one
who merely rents or bails personal property. Accord, Jones v. Klachkin, 22 Misc. 2d 631,
199 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1960); Waful v. Contractors Syracuse Sales Co., 219 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 31
Misc. 2d 77 (1961).
22 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, aff'd, 304 N.Y. 821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952).
23 Note Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50
(1964), holding that a blood transfusion was a "service" and not a "sale"; hence no
warranty could arise. Also, Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.,
132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. Super. Ct. 1965).
24 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963). For criticism of the case, see 39 Notre Dame
Law. 680, 686-7 (1964).
25 Stammer v. Mulvaney, 264 Wis. 244, 58 N.W.2d 671 (1953).
26 See Sam White Oldsmobile Co. v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 834, 836
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
27 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Indeed, in the absence of a sale, no warranty can arise with
respect to the product.
II. "FAULT" AS THE BASIS FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
A breach of a warranty, it is submitted, is in the nature of
tortious conduct, which presupposes "fault" on the part of the
seller or the product manufacturer. In the celebrated case of

Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.'s the highest New York
court fastened liability upon the assembler of the product, because breach of warranty is "a tortious wrong." In Gay v. A & P
Food Stores,2 9 the New York court in 1963 affirmed the tortious
nature of a breach of warranty:
Violation of a duty owing to another is a wrongful act; breach
of contract involving violation of duty may be likewise a wrongful

act .... Though the action may be brought solely for the breach
of implied warranty, the breach is a wrongful act, a default, and,
in its essential nature, a tort.
Underlying the Uniform Commercial Code is a basic recogrnition that imposition of liability does not rest upon any equitable
theory of distribution of loss, because it is axiomatic that "fault"
equals "liability," and "no fault" equals "no liability." Where
the seller or product manufacturer is "at fault," the warranty is
deemed to have been breached. In the absence of tortious conduct
or "fault," the warranty is not breached.30
28 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
29 39 Misc. 2d 360, 362, 240 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811-2 (1963). Contra, Angelilli Construction
Co. v. Sullivan and Son, 45 Misc. 2d 171, 256 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1964), holding that an action
for breach of warranty for property damage (and not for personal injury) was not a
"tortious act" within the meaning of N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302, and therefore the third party
defendant (a non-domiciliary from Ohio) was not subject to the jurisdiction of the New
York court. Mr. Justice Gagliardi opined: "It would be wrong to take pronouncements
in the changing law of privity so literally as to apply them uncritically to the changing
law of personal jurisdiction." Angelilli Construction Co. v. Sullivan and Son, id. at 174,
256 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
30 "Defective goods, not warranty, causes the harm to the remote person whether
sub-buyer or stranger. Here, the attack on the 'citadel of privity' is not an attack on
privity, but an attack on accepted bases of liability. Warranty is transactional behavioral.
To hold a manufacturer liable where he is free of negligence is to attack the general
principle of no liability (apart from contract or transaction) without fault and extend
the category of strict tort liability. Warranty is not strict liability in this sense and it is
immaterial that it may have been akin to tort in its origin. The bases for warranty,
express or implied, and the bases for non-transactional liability without fault are different. Liability for breach of warranty should be distinguished not only from liability
for deceit or negligence but also from the absolute or strict liability for certain nontransactional conduct (liability without fault). Liability on non-transactional principles
for conduct arising from or connected with a transaction is not precluded; but those
principles should not be confused with warranty." McCurdy, Warranty Privity in Sales
of Goods, 1 Houston L. Rev. 201, 225 (1964).

SIX PROBLEM AREAS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The tort concept of Reliance (upon the seller's skill or judgment) is essential to the cause of action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under § 2-314 and for breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under § 2-315. In
McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros.,"l the federal court in Pennsylvania
held that absence of proof of reliance upon the implied warranty
of fitness for particular purpose was ground for directing judgment
in favor of the seller. Indeed, the necessity for reliance upon the
seller's skill or judgment prompted the Sixth United States Court
of Appeals in Yount v. Positive Safety Manufacturing Co.

2

to bar

recovery to an employee for injuries allegedly sustained in the
use of defendant's machine.
Indeed, "fault" is the basis for breach of warranty.
III.

THE 4-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Under § 2-725 a four-year statute of limitations is delineated
with respect to sales, contracts of sale, actions based upon sales
contracts, and for breaches of warranty. In Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, the Pennsylvania court in 1964 held that the
4-year statutory period supplanted the 2-year statutory limitation
for personal injuries [and presumably the 6-year statute of limitations for commencement of a contract action]. Although the parties
may, by agreement, reduce this period of limitation to not less
than one year, they cannot extend the time beyond the 4-year
period [§ 2-725(1)].
The impact of this 4-year period upon the short statutes of
limitations for personal injuries in nearly all states does not seem
to have been recognized by the Code. Subsection (4) of § 2-725
to the effect that the state law on tolling the statute of limitations
is not altered nor modified in any respect, is simply untrue. California3 4 and New York 3 have recent decisions declaring that the
31 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Pa. 1963).

82 319 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1963).
83 413 Pa. 415, 193 A.2d 612 (1964). Note that prior to adoption of the Code the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that the 2-year statute of limitations governed
all actions for damages for personal injuries, whether arising out of tort or contract,
Jones v. Boggs and Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946).
34 Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Lai Wum
Chin Mock v. Belfast Beverages, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 2d 770, 14 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1961); and
Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
85 Alyssa Originals, Inc. v. Finkelstein, 22 App. Div. 2d 701, 254 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1964).
The court ruled that where the essence of the action is the defendant's negligence, the
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short (1 year in California and 3 years in New York) warranty
statute of limitations applies to all personal injury and death actions, regardless of whether they sound in tort or in contract.
Ohio, on the other hand, has ruled in one case 6 that in an action
for the sale of a dangerous substance, to wit: glass particles in
milk, the 2-year statute of limitations for personal injuries did
not control. Thus, there is the anomaly that the 4-year statute of
limitations is applicable to breach of warranty, and a 1-, 2-, or
3-year statute of limitations may be applicable to the same personal injury based on negligence.
The time of accrual of the cause of action is when the breach
of warranty occurs, i.e., the time "when tender of delivery is
made," regardless of the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the breach.
Only when the warranty is deemed to extend to future performance does the cause of action occur at the time the breach is or
should have been discovered [§ 2-725(2)]. It is submitted that
the statutory period for breach of warranty should begin to run
from the time of sale." It is immaterial when the defect in the
product was discovered or discoverable by the buyer or the seller.
Similarly, the statute of limitations in malpractice actions begins
upon commission and not the discovery of the malpractice. The
New York Court of Appeals in the Citizens Utilities case,3 9 in declaring that the time of sale and not the time of the discovery of
shorter statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries (herein property damages)
governs, even though the action is based upon alleged breach of covenants under a lease.
Here the plaintiff-tenant sought to recover for rain damage caused to its personal
property by failure of the defendant-landlord to exercise due care in maintaining the
roof and skylight of the leased premises. The five-judge court declared: "The test for
determining which statute of limitations is applicable in a given situation is: What is
the 'essence of the action,' not 'its mere name' . . . . The negligence of the landlord is
the crux of the causes of action here; and, without proof of such negligence, there can
be no recovery, since without negligence in this case, there is no independent breach of
the provisions in the lease." Alyssa Originals, Inc. v. Finkelstein, id. at 701, 254 N.Y.S.2d
at 23.
36 Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938). Cf. Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1951); Tomle v. New York Central
Railroad, 234 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
37 See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d
413 (1962); Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1960);
Gaffney v. Unit Crane and Shovel Corp., 49 Del. 381, 117 A.2d 237 (1955); and Outwater
v. Miller, 215 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See also Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Division,
145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1965).
38 See Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc. 2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1965), construing the
3-year statute of limitations under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(6).
39 Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d
171 (1962).
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the breach controls, warned about the evils of stretching "by implication" the promise or warranty.
IV.

DISCLAIMERS OF LIABILITY AND

LIMITATION

ON CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

All warranties may be disclaimed, not only by exclusion or
modification, as under § 2-316, but also, as a matter of law, when
the warranty is deemed to be unconscionable. A warranty or its
disclaimer is unenforceable by a court of law under § 2-302(1)
if it is unconscionable. Unfortunately, the Code does not contain
any definition of the word "unconscionable," but the term can be
characterized as the absence of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and fair dealing [See § 1-102(3) generally].
Under § 2-316(2) an oral disclaimer of merchantability is

conditioned upon seller's mention of merchantability. Under subparagraph (1) express warranties are presumed to be consistent
with each other (or with implied warranties), so that a disclaimer,
negation, or limitation on liability which is inconsistent with the
express warranty is inoperative under § 2-317. However, when
in good faith the express disclaimer is specific and conspicuously
disclosed,4" the express warranty must give way and be deemed
to have been disclaimed, negated, or limited in accord with the
disclaimer. Such express language as "there are no warranties that
extend beyond the description on the face hereof" is sufficient. 41
A reasonable construction of such disclaimer would effectuate the
result that the seller had made no express or implied warranties.
In Maryland Casualty Co.42 the federal court in West Virginia
opined: "Not only is there no express warranty, but there is an
express provision excluding any warranty. In the presence of such
an agreement between the parties (a disclaimer), no implied
warranty arises." In Williams v. Chrysler Corp.,43 the West Virginia Supreme Court stated:
40 Cf. Boeing Airplane Co., v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).

41 The Colorado Supreme Court in Yanish v. Fernandez, 397 P.2d 881, 882 (1965),
upheld the words "as is" and "no warranty" as a valid, enforceable disclaimer: "(The
words), even though relied upon by the buyer (prevents the representations of the
seller) from constituting express or implied warranties."
42 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Owen Illinois Glass Co., 116 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.
W. Va. 1953).
43 137 S.E.2d 225, 231 (WV.Va. 1964). See also McVey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 288
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The rule seems to be well established in this jurisdiction that a
party to a valid contract may in advance limit its liability so long
as one of the parties thereto is not a common carrier ....

This de-

cision is based wholly upon the finding that the express warranty
or disclaimer between the parties is controlling and that this action cannot be maintained.

Consequential damages, which include "injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty"
[under § 2-715(2)(b)], may be limited or excluded entirely."
However, under § 2-719(3) this limitation on consequential
damages, in the case of consumer goods, is expressly deemed to
be "prima facie unconscionable" and therefore unenforceable. No
rhyme nor reason is given for making sacrosanct "consumer goods,"
which are defined under § 9-109(1) as goods "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
[This definition is incorporated in Article 2 by virtue of § 2-103
(3) ]. Nevertheless, the seller or manufacturer of consumer products may still disclaim warranties under § 2-316. In Kean v.
Baldwin Auto Co., Inc.,4 5 The New York Supreme Court, ruled
that the standard automobile disclaimer was "a bar to any action
which might accrue to the plaintiff against the dealer upon a
breach of an express warranty" and also upon a breach of implied
warranties. Thus, the limitation on consequential damages must
give way to the enforceable disclaimer which is not unconscionable.
V.

EXTENSION
AND

OF BENEFITS OF WARRANTIES
PRIVITY

OF CONTRACT

The Uniform Commercial Code does not storm the citadel
of privity of contract. Under § 2-318 the benefits of a warranty,
express and implied, are merely extended to any natural person
who is in the family or the household of the buyer, or who is a
guest in the buyer's home, provided that it is reasonable to expect
F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1961), to the effect that a disclaimer of warranties is binding upon an
injured third person suing in warranty.
44 See National Steel Corp. v. L. G. Wasson Coal Mining Corp., 338 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1964), in which the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that a disclaimer,
providing that the seller shall not be liable for consequential damages arising out of the
use of defective material, barred the action for property damages.
See Also American Can Co. v. Horlamus Corp., 341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965): An
express warranty limiting a can manufacturer's liability to "the cost to the buyer of the
defective containers and any materials packed in them" was deemed effective and enforceable to limit a canned bread manufacturer's recovery for breach of implied warranty.
45 N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, March 19, 1964.

SIX PROBLEM AREAS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

that such a person may use, consume or be affected by the product,
and who is, in fact, injured in person or whose property is damaged by the breach of warranty. It has been expressly held that
neither a guest in an automobile,46 nor a subpurchaser, 47 nor an
employee of the purchaser 48 are beneficiaries of warranties under
this Section. Indeed, the Code expressly states that the language
of § 2-318 is not intended to enlarge the developing case law as
to whether the seller's warranties extend to other persons in the
distributive chain. Pennsylvania, the first state to enact the Code, 49
has consistently held that warranties cannot be implied in favor of
one not in the category of a purchaser in the distributive chain;
and that the doctrine of privity of contract is essential to the cause
of action for breach of warranty. 0
There is no inconsistency between (a) extension of the benefits of warranty, and (b) privity of contract. Even a liberal interpretation extending the benefits of warranties to persons other
than the purchaser does not negate privity of contract. Section
2-318 merely brings into the "charmed circle" those special persons who are accorded the privilege of having the product that
they may use or may consume warranted by the seller or product
manufacturer." Judge Skeel of the Ohio Court of Appeals in
Lonzrick v. Steel Corp.,52 in commenting upon the implied warranty sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, opined:
This statute does not deal with the rights of third persons not
parties to the sale who come into possession of the goods and use
them in the manner intended by the manufacturer and are thereby
injured by reason of the faulty condition of the goods latent in
46 Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
47 Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chemical Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
applying Pennsylvania law.
48 Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Driver v.
F. A. Mitchel Co., 35 F.R.D. 226 (D.C. Pa. 1964); Miller v. Chrysler Corp., 27 Ohio Op. 2d
270, 183 N.E.2d 421 (1962).
49 It is of interest to note that "when Pennsylvania enacted the Code, it had on its
statute books exactly the same uniform commercial acts which Alabama now has."
Schnader, Why Alabama Should Enact the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965, 17 Ala.
L.R. 1, 8 (1964).
50 Wilson v. American Chain and Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
51 See George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964), applying Florida
law. Here the employees of the purchaser of the DC-7C airplane were injured in the
crash, and were held not to be entitled to the benefits of the express warranties, either
as employees or as third party beneficiaries, because the manufacturer had confined the
warranties to those named in the contract.
52 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 375, 205 N.E.2d 92, 93 (1965).
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character due to improper manufacture or the use of faulty
materials.

Privity of contract, even under prevailing decisions, has not
been interred." Judge Froessel of the New York Court of Appeals,
5 4 expressly dein the oft-cited 4-3 decision in Randy Knitwear,
clared that the requirement of privity had not been dispensed with
"without limitation," for "we decide cases as they arise." It must
not be overlooked that the Randy Knitwear case involved (a)
breach of express, not implied warranties, and (b) property damage, not personal injuries. Eight months later the New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in Fortunato v. Craft, 55 also distinguished the Randy Knitwear case. The New York Appellate
Division, 4th Dept., on January 14, 1965, in Berzon v. Don Allen
Motors,5 6 opined that implied warranties could not be extended
beyond purchasers:
To extend Goldberg further to include bystanders and strangers,
such as the plaintiffs, would be such a radical departure from established law that if it is to be accomplished it should be done by

legislative action and not by judicial pronouncement. 57

53 See Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 265 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964), and
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The
privity rule still bars suit for breach of implied warranty in Georgia; R. H. Macy and
Co. v. Vest, 111 Ga. App. 85, 140 S.E.2d 491 (1965), although the case arose prior to the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under present Alabama law, privity of contract is essential to recovery for breach
of warranty against the manufacturer of a defective chattel: Cotton v. John Deere Plow
Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So. 2d 727 (1944); Loegler v. Hill, 238 Ala. 606, 193 So. 120 (1940);
Hood v. Warren, 236 Ala. 247, 183 So. 415 (1938); Attalla Oil and Fertilizer Co. v.
Goddard, 207 Ala. 287, 92 So. 794 (1922); Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark,
205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921). Adoption of the Code would leave this rule intact in cases
where the plaintiff is the buyer. Alabama also presently bars recovery for lack of privity
where the plaintiff in a warranty case is someone other than the buyer. In Sterchi Bros.
Stores v. Castleberry, 236 Ala. 349, 182 So. 474 (1938), the court reasoned that a seller's
warranty does not in itself impose any liability on a seller to third persons who are in
no way parties to the contract because of the absence of privity of contract.
54 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 16, 181 N.E.2d
399, 405 (1962).
55 21 App. Div. 2d 330, 250 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1964).
56 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965).
57 Id. at 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 644. Arkansas by statute (Act 35, Laws of 1965) has
limited the application of the privity requirement, effective June 9, 1965, by declaring
that the defense of privity of contract cannot be invoked by product manufacturers or
vendors if the plaintiff claiming damages was a person whom the manufacturer or
vendor might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the product.
It is submitted that the Arkansas statute is consistent with § 2-318 of the Code, for such
persons are within the "charmed circle" of foreseeability, unlike donees or bystanders.
Cf. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), wherein a
bystander was injured by a defective shotgun shell; the case being decided under the
Uniform Sales Act. Judge O'Hara's ringing dissent emphasized: "An action for breach of
warranty whether or not sounding in tort, is still essentially a contract action. To recover
thereunder a plaintiff has to have some relationship to the contract of sale, and the use
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In Berry v. American Cyanamid Company,5" the Sixth United
States Court of Appeals, applying Tennessee law, dismissed the
implied warranty causes of action, and declared:
We must reject the argument that there was privity of contract
between the plaintiff and Lederle. Privity of contract, as we understand it, is the relationship between two contracting parties.
Clearly here, under the pleading, the plaintiff had no relationship
with Lederle. He did not purchase the drug from Lederle. His
only contact in the transaction was with his physician. The
physician was not the agent of Lederle either in fact or by implication of law.
In Olga Dani Lindsey v. Clairol Inc.,59 Chief Judge Thomas J.
Clary granted defendant's motion for a direct verdict:
The law of Texas .. .with respect to warranty ...

requires that

the warranty run directly from the maker to the consumer, and if
there is an intervening party, as there was here, the warranty
does not run for lack of privity ....
And the landmark New Jersey case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors,60 was severely limited to its facts by the New Jersey Appellate Division in Santor v. A. and M. Karagheusian Inc."l At the
trial plaintiff recovered upon breach of implied warranty (from
the product manufacturer and its carpet distributor) the purchase
price of the allegedly defective carpeting. But the appellate court
reversed, citing New Jersey Study Comment, Annotation of Uniform Commercial Code, N.J.S. 12 A: 2-313: "New Jersey has held
that privity of contract is needed to maintain an action for b.reach
of warranty. ' 62 The court also favorably cited a 1963 federal court
case in New Jersey:6 3 "A person not a party to a contract, nor in
privity thereto, cannot sue in respect to a breach of a duty aris'64
ing out of contract.
VI.

"WARRANTY"

DEFINED IN TERMS OF REASONABLENESS

With the avowed design of consolidating and systematizing
basic principles the Code has set forth definitions of "warranty."
which implicitly follows thereafter." Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., supra at -,
133 N.W.2d at 133.
58 341 F.2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1965).
59 Civil No. 3191, U.S. District Court, W.D. Tex., San Antonio Div., Feb. 2, 1965.
60 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
61 82 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d 589 (1964), rev'd, 44 N.J. 521, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
62 To the same effect, see Walton v. Gunthrie, 50 Tenn. App. 383, 362 S.W.2d 41

(1963).
63
64

Martins Ferreira v. Jayess Corp., 214 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.J. 1963).
See Beck v. Spindler, 257 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
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The implied warranty of merchantability is described under
§ 2-314 as arising by implication out of a contract of sale, a course
of dealing, and the usage of the trade. The implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose is delineated under § 2-315, although neither "fitness" nor "particular purpose" are defined.
Express warranties under § 2-313 may be created by affirmation
or promise, by description and by sample or model. Words of art
or formal language are not necessary, but a mere statement of
value or opinion or commendation of the product does not create
an express warranty [§ 2-313(2)]. The implied warranties are
qualified and perhaps limited to a seller who, as a merchant,
"deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction" [§§ 2-103 and 2-104(1)].
By defining "merchantability" under § 2-314(2), the Uniform Commercial Code has provided defense attorneys with six
fingers to the proverbial hand! For a product manufacturer or
vendor to be liable for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(a) the product does not pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible products, the product is not of
fair average quality within the description; and
(c) the product is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which
such product is used; 65 and

(d) the product does not run within the variations permitted by the agreement of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;6 6 and
(e) the product is not adequately contained, packaged and
labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) the product does not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
While these criteria do not purport to exhaust the meaning of
merchantability, it is unfortunate that § 2-314(2)(e) does not
define "adequately" with respect to the labeling of the product.
Full compliance with pertinent federal, state or local labeling
See Grau v. Procter and Gamble Co., 324 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1963).
66 See Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964).
65
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statutes should preclude a court from ruling that the product
labeling was inadequate, and that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached.67
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
necessitates that (a) the seller at the time of sale have reason to
know the particular purpose for which the product was bought,"8
and (b) the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment. In
the area of an allergic response to a product, no such implied
warranty can arise unless the seller at the time of sale had reason
to know of the individual buyer's idiosyncracy or predisposition
to the product. 69 But purchase of the product by its patent or trade

name does not negate the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose.7
If a product is defective, 71 deleterious, or inherently dangerous, the implied warranties have been breached; and if the breach
67 Note Ferguson v. Chas. Pfizer and Co. (Ore. 1964), which resulted in a jury verdict
for the vaccine product manufacturer. Judge Langtry's charge to the jury on the implied
warranty of merchantability was crucial: "The warranty of merchantability . . . is that
this product shall be reasonably fit for use as a vaccine to immunize the plaintiff, like
other people . . . . This does not mean it must be perfectly adapted to such use."
68 For a recent illustration of a gross misconception in an effort to overprotect the
consumer, see Crane v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754
(1963), wherein the plaintiff and her husband had purchased a surface preparer for
use in painting the interior of their restaurant. The label on the product read as
follows: "CAUTION INFLAMMABLE MIXTURE. Do not use near fire or flame ....
Contains more than 15% Benzol-Beware of Poisonous Fumes!l" Plaintiff and her husband, working with the windows open, applied some of the product to a wall when a
sudden "whoosh" of flame engulfed the room and plaintiff caught on fire. The source
of the flame was apparently a water heater about six feet from where the plaintiff was
working. In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, the California Court in 1963 upheld the
following instruction: "To comply with this duty the manufacturer or supplier must
appropriately label the product, giving due consideration to the likelihood of accident
and the seriousness of consequences from failure to so label it as to warn of any dangers
that are inherent in it and its use or that may arise from improper handling or use of
the product." The Court defined the scope of the warning in terms of "reasonableness."
Evidently, the jury felt that the labeling or instructions about poisonous fumes and inflammability were deficient because they did not mention combustibility or explosiveness.
And yet the technical difference between combustibility and flammability is not for the
layman; there can be no doubt that the plaintiff would not have altered his conduct
if the labeling had the additional words "combustible" or "explosive." It is difficult to
accept the premise of the jury that the product was improperly labeledl It also appears
that the court refused to entertain the fact of contributory negligence, for the plaintiff
had foolishly and carelessly used the product within six feet of the source of the flame.
69 See Howard v. Avon Products, Inc., 395 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1964).
70 See Kansas City Bolt Co. v. Rodd, 220 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1915).
71 See Gardner v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 510, 127 N.W.2d 557, 561-2
(1964): "Before liability can result from a breach of implied warranty, there must be
It must
proof from which an inference is premissible that the product was defective ....
appear that the defect, if there was one, was the producing cause of the mishap." Also,
Kaspirowitz v. Shering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (1961).
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was the proximate cause of the injury or damage, liability should
result. However, the basic problem is again one of lack of definition of "defect," and we must go outside the Code to seek definition. "Defective condition" is defined in comment g of the Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (1962), as "in a . . . condition . . . not contemplated by the ultimate user, which will be
unresaonably dangerous to him." Under comment i, "unreasonably dangerous" is construed as "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases . . . (the product), with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." Comment k
further delineates:
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable danger.

Thus, the concept of Reasonableness is applicable to all breaches
of warranty. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,72 sanctioned the charge to the jury that, if the product was reasonably
fit for its intended or ordinary use, the product manufacturer was
relieved of liability for alleged breach of the warranty. Judge
Choate charged that if the product was "unwholesome for the
general public," "not suitable for use for the general public," or

"endangers the general public to some degree, not individuals,

but general public," only then was the plaintiff entitled to recover:
I instruct you that this implied warranty of reasonable fitness does
not impose upon the defendant the duty to make an absolutely safe
product. It does not mean that the goods7 are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing injury. 3
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Jakubowsky v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,7" in reversing the Appellate
72 The proceedings in the district court are unreported. For an interesting history
of the case on appeal see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962),
certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963), answer conformed to, 325
F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943, 84 Sup. Ct. 1349 (1964).
73 Ibid.
74 42 N.J. 177, 182, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964), reversing, 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d
275 (1963).
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Division, ruled that "the evidence (was) insufficient to establish
an unreasonably dangerous condition of the product attributable
to the defendant .... The plaintiff must show that the goods of
which he complains were unreasonably dangerous for their intended use, and that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed
when the goods left the defendant's hands .... The necessity for
such proof is implicit in the opinion of this Court in Henningsen .... It is precisely for this reason . . that we find the plaintiff has failed to prove a breach of warranty." The court concluded:
The implied warranty of merchantability means that the product
is reasonably fit75for the purpose intended; it does not imply absolute perfection.

The California Supreme Court, in Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,76 found no breach of implied warranties because a
product manufacturer's duty is to reasonably guard against probabilities of injury from the use of the product, not against possibilities of injury. An allergic response is delineated as a "possibility,"
and the implied warranty of merchantability did not run to the
product. 77 And in the Olga Dani Lindsey case, the federal court
declared:
A manufacturer is not an insurer of its product so that the mere
showing of the accident or trouble with the product entitles the
person to recover. The plaintiff must show that there is some
dereliction of duty on the part of the manufacturer which proximately caused the accident, and there is absolutely no testimony
in this record which would warrant you in making a finding that
the defendant was derelict in its duty. It can be responsible only
for conditions that it can reasonably foresee, and there is no testimony here that I have
found that justifies a jury in making
such a determination.78

Section 2-607(3)(a) provides for notice of breach of warranty
to be given by the buyer to the seller or product manufacturer,
despite the language of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.,79
that such notice was not a condition precedent.80 The notice re75
76
77

Id. at 185, 199 A.2d at 831.
214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963).
See also Kaempfe v. Lehn and Fink, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840

(1964).
78 Olga Dani Lindsey v. Clairol, Inc., Civil No. 3191, U.S. District Court, W.D. Tex.,
San Antonio Div., Feb. 2, 1965.
79 59 Cal. 2d 27, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). Note that California deleted
§ 2-318 from their enactment of the Code.
80 In Alabama the giving of notice must be affirmatively pleaded. Smith v. Pizitz,
Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960).
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quirements under §§ 1-201(25), (26) and (27), as well as the
reasonable time conditions under § 1-204, are simply definitions
but are applicable to the warranty sections, §§ 2-312 to 2-318,
inclusive. Under § 2-607(3)(a) the buyer who has accepted the product "must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred
from any remedy."
In closing, I would like to swing the cudgel for one moment
against the plaintiffs' bar associations which are surreptitiously
endeavoring to undermine the very foundations of the law of
products liability. In their mad-rush toward Absolute Liability or
"liability without fault," these stalwarts have recently begun to
focus attention upon the advertising of the product, in the mistaken belief that the product manufacturer's liability can be
extended in an action for deceit, negligent misrepresentation,
false advertising, and/or breach of warranty by advertising.s ' In

82
Massachusetts, for example, there is a false advertising statute
which makes it a crime for-

any person who, with intent to sell . .. merchandise .
public .

.

.

. to the

. or who, with intent to increase the consumption or

demand for such merchandise . . . makes . . . circulates or places
before the public . . . an advertisement of any sort . . . which advertisement contains any assertion, representation, or statement
of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, and which such
person knew, or might on reasonable investigation have ascertained to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading ....

Plaintiffs' bar associations wishfully contend that this criminal
statute gives a civil right of recovery to product consumers. But,

violation of a penal statute in Massachusetts is merely evidence
of negligence,

3

and does not give rise to a tortious cause of action

nor to an action for breach of warranty by advertising. Indeed, a
1963 amendment 84 provides for injunctive relief at the hands of the
attorney general or the aggrieved party (who is presumably a
product competitor who was hurt by the false advertising). The
statutory remedy excludes any action at law by a consumer for
damages. Indeed, whether a civil action sounds in false advertising,
81 See Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), applying Massachusetts law, and Pritchard v. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
82 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 91 (1963).
88 See Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 146 Mass. 596, 16 N.E. 555 (1888).
84 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 222 (1963).
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negligent misrepresentation, or breach of warranty by advertising,
the plaintiff consumer must still prove-(a) the product manufacturer made certain representations of fact, (b) which were in
fact false; (c) the product manufacturer knew the representation
to be false (scienter); and (d) the representations were made
with the intent to deceive the plaintiff consumer; (e) the plaintiff
consumer relied to his detriment upon the representations, and
(f) the plaintiff was in fact free from contributory negligence.
Bridging the gap between liability and non-liability cannot be
done by artful thinking. The Uniform Commercial Code was not
intended to be an instrument for foisting strict liability upon the
American product manufacturer. Whatever the social desirability
of greater consumer protection, if there is any change to be made,
it is for the Legislature and not for the courts to change the law
by ignoring pertinent case decisions.
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